Julian Corbett's 1911 treatise builds upon the foundation laid by Clausewitz to translate the ideas of military strategy on land into general principals as they apply to the sea. Corbett discusses ways of integrating the land and sea forces mutually to support the political objective. He offers a modern insight into Clausewitz's ideas concerning limited war and bridges the gap between a continental perspective and a global one.Corbett's ideas remain intensely relevant to any practitioner of the military, strategic, or political arts. I would suggest that every technological development that would appear to change the basic principals of naval strategy has an answer in a countervailing measure, such that the nature of naval strategy has not fundamentally changed, but only broadened, since this was written. For example, cruise missiles, ICBMs and aircraft carriers change the details, but not the nature, of maritime support to the national strategy. I would also offer that many of Corbett's insights are not limited to the sea services, and that all strategists would do well to incorporate his wisdom in forming a complete analysis.Finally, Corbett's book is a very fine example of high level strategic thought. Whether you agree or disagree with his core concepts, the study is important to broaden your strategic thinking.This is a key part of any military-strategic library.